SMAPs: Short Message Authentication Protocols by Baqer, Khaled et al.
SMAPs:
Short Message Authentication Protocols
Khaled Baqer1, Johann Bezuidenhoudt2, Ross Anderson1, and Markus Kuhn1
1 Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
{khaled.baqer,ross.anderson,markus.kuhn}@cl.cam.ac.uk
2 Leonine Initiatives (Pty) Ltd., South Africa
jb@leonine.biz
Abstract. There is a long history of authentication protocols designed
for ease of human use, which rely on users copying a short string of dig-
its. Historical examples include telex test keys and early nuclear firing
codes; familiar modern examples include prepayment meter codes and
the 3-digit card verification values used in online shopping. In this paper,
we show how security protocols that are designed for human readability
and interaction can fail to provide adequate protection against simple at-
tacks. To illustrate the problem, we discuss an offline payment protocol
and explain various problems. We work through multiple iterations, or
‘evolutions’, of the protocol in order to get better tradeoffs between se-
curity and usability. We discuss the limitation of verifying such protocols
using BAN logic. Our aim is to develop usable human-friendly protocols
that can be used in constrained offline environments. We conclude that
protocol designers need to be good curators of security state, and also pay
attention to the interaction between online and offline functions. In fact,
we suggest that delay-tolerant networking might be a future direction of
evolution for protocol research.
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1 Introduction
Mobile payment systems have transformed the life of people in less developed
countries (LDCs), bringing a convenient means of exchange and store of value to
people living far from any conventional banking service. For rural people, phone
payments enable everything from pensions to farm subsidies to be paid directly
and efficiently, reducing the possibility for corruption and extortion. Even for
people living in large cities, phone payments have greatly cut the cost of financial
services. A further key application is remittances: migrant workers who have
moved from the countryside to the city can send cash home to relatives. However
the currently deployed systems, such as M-PESA (Kenya), use SMS or USSD
as their carrier, and they stop when the network does. This leaves hundreds
of millions of the world’s very poorest people stranded. Living off-network in
mountains, forests and small islands, they still have to use cash for transactions
in their village, and are fully exposed to the depredations of dishonest officials.
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There are four major limitations of current phone payments. First, both
merchant and customer have to be online, so they don’t work in areas without
network coverage. Second, the cost of the SMS is unnecessary when half the
customer’s transactions are with the same village merchant. Third, existing sys-
tems are mostly locked in to a particular telco and bank as they rely on SMS or
USSD. This lock-in increases costs and prevents inter-scheme payments, which
is a problem for migrant workers. Fourth, most payment systems operate online.
Resilience is not considered thoroughly, at least not beyond providing redundant
servers to process requests. When networks go down because of power cuts or
congestion, or rural networks close at night because base stations depend on
solar panels and have no batteries, payment services cease.
Electronic purses for offline payments exist in the academic literature, and are
also fielded, whether as standalone systems or EMV extensions (e.g. UEPS [1]
and Germany’s Geldkarte3). However they have not been implemented by LDC
mobile providers, who can install SIM-toolkit applets. There are both engineering
and business issues; we are less concerned with the latter here, as they vary widely
between countries.
The engineering issue is that existing purse systems are designed for complex
messaging between the purses (e.g. between the purse in a smartcard and another
purse embedded in a parking meter or ATM) while phone-to-phone payments
conducted in the absence of a network or direct link (NFC, Bluetooth, infrared,
etc.) must by default rely on users copying numbers between their phones. The
protocols must therefore be redesigned for usability, which means minimising the
number of digits that need to be typed while supporting robust error handling
and recovery.
In this paper, we show how security protocols that are designed for human
readability and interaction can end up vulnerable to simple attacks. To illustrate
the problem, we discuss our attempt to design an offline payment protocol, and
the various problems we had to deal with. We present multiple iterations, or
‘evolutions’, that the protocol went through as we sought to get reasonable
tradeoffs between security and usability. Our target demographic is phone users
in LDCs, many of whom are illiterate.
2 System Model
The concept of operations is similar to existing phone payments, except that
payments also work when the phone is offline. Sam is a GSM SIM card issuer who
may also operate the offline payment system described in this paper, which allows
payments between SIM purses in areas with intermittent network coverage. In
the following examples, Alice will play the role of a paying customer and Bob
will be the shop owner receiving payment, but these roles can be reversed. Sam
issues a SIMA to Alice and SIMB to Bob.
The SIMs of Alice and Bob interact with each other only via human decimal
number entry and comparison. Therefore, this protocol has to carefully ensure
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geldkarte
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that SIMA and SIMB agree on their transaction history, in spite of the low
entropy of the manually-executed challenge–response round trips. The SIMs send
records of past payments back to Sam whenever they detect network coverage,
for reconciliation between their bank accounts.
In some applications, the network may be intermittent rather than absent,
and so a side benefit of our protocols is that they can enable payment networks
to support delay-tolerant authentication (see Section 4.2).
Where both Alice and Bob have smartphones that can communicate directly
(Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, etc.), a very capable offline payment system can be built
with conventional tools. However, many poor people use simple GSM phones that
cannot communicate with each other directly in the absence of a GSM network.
Then the only way for SIM-toolkit applets to communicate across phones is that
their users copy sequences of displayed decimal digits. Numerical transactions are
already familiar from other systems such as airtime purchases and prepayment
utility meters. It is well known, for example, that even illiterate people can cope
with twenty-digit sequences provided these are arranged as five groups of four
digits, which is enough for a 64-bit ciphertext, and is used in prepayment meters,
but is about the usable limit [2].
3 Design Evolution
The following setup is required in each iteration of the protocol. SIMA and SIMB
are identified in the protocols by unique, human-recognisable decimal numbers
A and B respectively, typically their phone numbers. Sam embeds an individual
symmetric 128-bit private key KA into SIMA and KB into SIMB , which are
tamper-resistant to some extent. (Sam could generate these keys from a master
key KS using a key-derivation function, such as KA = hKS (A), KB = hKS (B)).
These per-card keys are each known only to Sam and to one single SIM card.
3.1 Basic Protocol
The basic payment protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Alice agrees to pay Bob X and each of them enters both this amount and
the other party’s phone number into their phones.
2. Bob chooses a 3-digit nonce NB and forms a 3-digit MAC C (using the
shared secret key K) of B and X. He tells Alice the values
(NB , C) where C = MacK(B,A,X,NB) mod 10
3 (1)
with Mac being a 64-bit message-authentication-code function.
3. Alice verifies C. She now believes that she and Bob agree on the amount X
and the payer and payee phone numbers A and B (with probability 0.999).
4. Alice authorises the transaction by entering her PIN; her purse decrements
its balance by X and generates a 3-digit nonce plus a 4-digit MAC to bind
her name and nonce to the data contained in the challenge C:
(NA, R) where R = MacK(A,NA, C,NB , B) mod 10
4 (2)
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5. Bob enters NA and R into his purse, and checks it increments by X.
Verification. We then analysed this protocol via the Burrows–Abadi–Needham
(BAN) logic [7]. We idealised the protocol as:
B −→ A : {B,A,X,NB}K (= C)
A −→ B : {A,NA, C,NB , B}K (= R)
We wished to prove that Bob the shopkeeper should trust the payment
amount X, i.e. B |≡ X. This can only be deduced using jurisdiction rule,
for which we need B |≡ A |⇒ X (B believes A has jurisdiction over X) and
B |≡ A |≡ X (B believes A believes X).
The former follows from our trust in the software, which has the property
that it only creates ciphertexts that start with its own identifier. The value X is
contained in the challenge C (but see Section 3.2). The latter, that B |≡ A |≡ X,
must be deduced using the nonce verification rule from ]R (R is fresh) and
B |≡ A |∼ X (B believes A uttered X).
Now ]R follows from the fact that R = h(K;A,NA, C,NB , B) and contains
the nonce NB Bob just generated. B believes A uttered X from the software
constraint already mentioned.
In our original design, we did not include NB in Bob’s challenge, and as a
result could not get the protocol to verify. This is in effect what happens with
EMV, which in consequence is vulnerable to the preplay attack [6]. In our initial
design, we also wondered whether C should contain Alice’s phone number too:
C = MacK(B,A,X,NB). The BAN analysis showed this is superfluous. However
we include it for error-detection, as discussed later.
However, despite the fact that the protocol verified, there was an attack.
3.2 Evolution 1: Eliminating Narrow Pipes
A crooked merchant Bob can perform the following attack against Alice:
1. Alice agrees on price X and Bob receives Alice’s phone number A.
2. Bob now chooses a higher price X ′.
3. Bob then repeatedly feeds X and X ′ to his SIMB , which will generate a new
nonce NB each time and output a MAC C. Bob continues until he finds a
colliding pair with the same MAC (X,NB) and (X
′, N ′B) such that
MacK(A,X,NB , B) ≡ MacK(A,X ′, N ′B , B) ≡ C mod 103.
This will take just a few dozen trials for a 3-digit MAC.
4. Bob aborts all the trial transactions except for the last one for (X ′, N ′B).
5. Bob then gives (NB , C) to Alice, but asks his own SIMB to proceed with
the last one, using N ′B and X
′.
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This way, Alice makes a payment for X, but Bob receives one for X ′ > X,
violating conservation of money.
The vulnerability is that R only includes C, not X, and while C depends
on X, C does not have enough entropy to prevent an online collision attack by
Bob against SIMB that allows X
′ to replace X. Once this is noticed, the fix is
easy: include the amount X in the input to the payment MAC R, rather than
the challenge C.
Such attacks are beyond the scope of BAN, which was only intended for
protocols involving cryptographically long nonces and MACs, and does not keep
track of guessing entropy or collision risks. Some more modern cryptographic
verification tools (e.g. CryptoVerif [5]) can quantify such probabilities.
Anyway, the repaired protocol now runs:
1. Alice agrees to pay Bob X.
2. Bob chooses a 3-digit nonce NB , forms a 3-digit MAC C with B and X, and
sends Alice:
(NB , C) where C = MacK(B,A,X,NB) mod 10
3 (3)
3. Alice verifies C to ensure they agree on payer, payee and amount.
4. Alice authorises the transaction by entering her PIN; her purse decrements
its balance by X and generates a 3-digit nonce plus a 4-digit MAC:
(NA, R) where R = MacK(A,NA, X,NB , B) mod 10
4 (4)
5. Bob enters NA and R into his purse, and checks it increments by X.
The verification proceeds as before, although by now we might place less reliance
on a BAN-logic verification of a short message authentication protocol.
3.3 Evolution 2: Transaction Chaining
The revised protocol still raised security concerns:
1. Bob could try to add money to his SIM card by faking transactions with
fake customers and just guessing the response R. Each attempt will succeed
only with probability 10−4, and repeated attempts can be blocked by a retry
counter. We can also mix up R with NA. However the detailed design is far
from trivial. For example, Bob could connect SIMB to a PC to automate an
attack, and interleave guessing attempts with real payments from a customer
SIM he controls. In the worst-case attack, Bob is the local payment service
agent, and has hundreds of customer SIM cards in stock. We need to make
the fraud probability acceptably low without making the authorisation code
too long or otherwise making operations too complex or fragile.
2. Alice can similarly fake a transaction with probability 10−4, but this may be
less of a concern in practice, as Alice cannot repeat thousands of transaction
attempts against SIMB without the collaboration of Bob. But a colluding
Bob could just run the attack without Alice (see above).
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3. Bob can also try to fake transactions with real customers A, by keeping a
record of their MacK(A,NA, X,NB , B) replies. In such a fake transaction,
Bob can choose A and NA, and if the real Alice has already paid n times in
the past for a regularly bought item of fixed price X, then Bob has enough
data to be able to look up a valid pair (NB , R) to complete a fake transaction
with probability n · 10−3.
The last attack is of particular concern if Alice makes daily purchases of the
same price X for years, as the probability of Bob being able to fake a transaction
response R from SIMA approaches one. Our solution is to establish a payment
session between Alice and Bob that maintains additional shared entropy stored
in both SIMA and SIMB . We include this state in the MAC inputs, such that
knowledge of past MAC responses no longer helps Bob guess future ones. We
also replace NA and NB with MACs of the transaction data that only the bank
Sam can verify. Then even if a fake transaction is accepted by a SIM, it will still
be spotted when one of the parties eventually uploads it to Sam.
Most phone payment transactions in LDCs are to familiar recipients. A vil-
lager will do most of their shopping at the one village store; a migrant worker
will make most remittance payments to his wife or perhaps his mum back in
his home village. So the obvious next evolution is to look for ways in which
subsequent payments can be made easier. This has been a familiar strategy in
established online banking systems for about 30 years now.
If the security of payments authenticated using short codes must depend
on maintaining as much shared security state as possible, then why not use a
hash chain of all transactions in the current session, rather than just the current
transaction context?
Let a payment session be a hash chain maintained in both cards. Its state
is kept in each card as a 256-bit value Si, along with a transaction counter i.
When A and B start a new series of transactions, both their SIMs initialise this
session as a hash state of
T0 := (A,B) (5)
S0 := H(0, T0) (6)
i := 0 (7)
where H is a collision-resistant hash function with 256-bit output (e.g., SHA-
256 or SHA-3). The transaction counter i records how many payments have been
committed in this session. Alice and Bob now should have the same value of S0.
SIMA and SIMB also set up a shared transaction key KAB . At this stage we
can assume it is simply derived from their phone numbers using a key derivation
function and the universal shared secret K: KAB = hK(A,B). (In Section 4 we
discuss options for mitigating the risk of a shared master secret.)
Once the payment session is established, Alice can pay Bob as follows:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a price X.
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2. Alice and Bob then select the payment session to be used, and their SIMs
retrieve not just A and B but also the hash chain values (i, Si).
3. SIMA checks that X is within limits agreed with Sam, and that Alice’s
on-card purse value MA has enough funds for the transaction, presumably
MA − X ≥ 0. It aborts the transaction otherwise. Likewise, SIMB checks
whether both X and its purse value MB + X are within limits agreed with
Sam, and aborts if not. (Transaction limits agreed with Sam may be variable,
and depend on for example X, i, A, or B.)
4. Bob’s SIMB generates and displays a challenge of nc,1 deterministic digits
that Alice and Sam can verify, nc,2 deterministic digits that Sam can verify,
as well as nc,3 digits of random entropy to help ensure that payment sessions




[(MacKAB (i, Si, X) mod 10
nc,1) ‖
(MacKB (i, Si, X, FB) mod 10
nc,2) ‖ NB ]
(8)
which Alice copies into her phone. Here 0 ≤ NB < 10nc,3 is a number
picked by SIMB and ‖ is concatenation of decimal digits. Enc is a pseudo-
random permutation over Z10nc (see [4]), to ensure that adversaries cannot
be certain about the function of individual digits without knowing KAB .
FB is optional other information that can be included and that SIMB will
eventually transmit to Sam (but not to SIMA) such as MB or a timestamp,
added as an entropy source and as forensic evidence of disputed transactions.




[(MacKAB (i, Si, X,Ci+1) mod 10
nr,1) ‖
(MacKA(i, Si, X,Ci+1, FA) mod 10
nr,2) ‖ NA]
(9)
containing nr,1 digits that Bob can verify, nr,2 digits that Sam can verify, and
nr,3 digits NA chosen by SIMA. FA is optional other information that SIMA
will record and eventually transmit to Sam, such as MA or a timestamp.
6. SIMA then updates its non-volatile state and on-card transaction records:
MA := MA −X (10)
i := i + 1 (11)
Ti := (Si−1, X,Ci, Ri) (12)
Si := H(i, Ti) (13)
7. SIMA finally displays its response message (9).
8. Bob types Ri+1 into his phone, which reports the success or otherwise of the
transaction.
The point of hash chaining is twofold:
– Even if someone gets lucky and guesses a correct authentication code Ri for
an individual transaction, this will still leave the underlying security state Si
inconsistent between Alice and Bob, between whom subsequent transactions
will then fail with high probability.
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– The entropy of the security state Si makes it less likely that a query to
MacKAB is ever repeated. This reduces the risk that knowledge of past values
of R and C can help an attacker to predict future such values, and use these
to set up fake transactions.
There are various attacks to consider, for example Bob can complete a fake
transaction on SIMB with probability 10
−nr,1 , or duplicate sessions to double-
spend Alice’s responses. To fine-tune such risks, we can vary the number of digits
allocated in the exchanged messages C and R between the first transaction and
later transactions in a session, for example:
nc,1 nc,2 nc,3 nr,1 nr,2 nr,3
first transaction 1 1 3 6 3 3
later transactions 1 1 1 4 3 0
In addition, we need to limit the number of failed transactions:
– A SIM can keep a record of failed transactions and can ensure that only a
fraction of all transaction attempts per session are allowed to fail. For exam-
ple, a payment session can be terminated once 5 of the last 10 transaction
attempts have failed. Such retry limits should be implemented only on a
per-session basis, to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks, where an
adversary deliberately exhausts a SIM-wide retry limit.
– If retry limits apply per session, we then also need to limit the total number
of sessions that a SIM can participate in, to well below 10nr,1 , e.g. a few
thousand. This way, Bob cannot iterate fake transactions across many non-
existing customers.
The exact limits and number of authentication-code digits can be tuned based on
risk analysis and usability studies. They could also be made variable, though the
usability consequences would have to be carefully tested. Likewise, the content
of FA and FB remain for further study.
4 Mitigating the Risk of a Shared Master Secret
4.1 Evolution 3: Group Key Scheme
If smartcards were perfectly tamper-resistant, then the initial design would be
largely complete at this point. They are certainly more resistant than was the
case twenty years ago, when large-scale compromises of pay-TV smartcards were
pretty well an annual occurrence. This is partly due to technological improve-
ments such as side-channel countermeasures, top-layer sensor meshes, and ran-
domised place-and-route; and partly due to minimising the value that can be
extracted by cloning a single card. In EMV, for example, the keys authenticate
transactions on a single account, so the extractable value is typically in the low
tens of thousands of dollars, rather than the millions that could be made from
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cloning a pay-TV card. As long as reverse engineering a card costs tens of thou-
sands of dollars and the attacker needs perhaps a dozen identical cards to work
with, this is probably enough.
The overlay SIMs used in our field trial are not certified to EMV standards,
though the vendor assures us that an EMV compliant overlay product will be
available in due course. So in the short term we might deploy a two-tier system
in which merchants get a high-security EMV-certified SIM card containing a
master key while customers get a medium-security overlay SIM card containing
a derived key, namely their phone number or card serial number encrypted under
the master key to provide a diversified key. This is the approach used for some 20
years in UEPS and for a decade in Geldkarte. It would thus have the advantage
of being familiar to banks and their insurers, with a zero loss history and the
comfort that comes from reusing existing standards and business processes. If
anyone seeking to monetise a break of a card needed, as a practical matter, to
extract money from merchants (as the other users are too dispersed and too
poor) then it could make perfect business sense.
The downside with this approach is that a substantial volume of LDC phone
payments are migrant remittances, where neither the sender nor the receiver is
a merchant.
A second approach is combinatorial keying, which was proposed in the 1990s
in the context of satellite TV, where it was known as ‘broadcast encryption’,
and attempted to give each pay-TV subscriber a set of keys of which some
suitable subset could enable her to decrypt each programme. If a card were
cloned, then that particular subset could be blacklisted without this affecting
the great majority of other subscribers; only a small number of subscribers with
the same subset of keys would have to be issued with replacement cards.
A similar idea can be adapted here, where the communications are many-
to-many. For example, we can divide all users into d = 100 key groups, give
everyone 100 out of 5,050 keys, and thus require an attacker who wanted to
impersonate any user to clone 100 cards rather than just one.
In more detail: Sam generates a set of shared 128-bit group keys, in the form
of an upper triangular matrix of d(d+1)/2 keys (Ki,j)0≤i≤j<d. (Sam could again
generate all these from a master key Ks using a key-derivation function, such as
Ki,j = hKs(i, j)).
Each interoperable SIM issued by Sam also contains a common private 128-
bit key Kg. Sam uses Kg to assign each SIM to one of d key groups (d ≈ 102),
using a pseudo-random function applied to its phone number:
gA := hKg(A) mod d (14)
gB := hKg(B) mod d (15)
Sam stores in each SIM in key group gA the d group keys
GA = {K0,gA ,K1,gA , . . . ,KgA−1,gA ,KgA,gA ,KgA,gA+1, . . .KgA,d−1}. (16)
(and equivalently for SIMs in group gB , etc).
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SIMA and SIMB can now secure their message exchanges using the key
KAB =
{
hKgA,gB (A,B) if gA ≤ gB
hKgB,gA (A,B) if gA > gB .
(17)
KgA,gB or KgB ,gA will be available in both SIMA and SIMB , and both can use
Kg to select it. Any other SIMU picked at random (for reverse engineering) by
someone who does not know Kg will contain it only with probability 2d
−1−d−2
(i.e. 2d−1 if gA 6= gB and d−1 if gA = gB).
This is straightforward to do if each user gets a SIM card issued by a payment
service provider that is also the phone company. Where the two are different,
and especially if the payment service runs on an overlay SIM independent of the
phone company’s SIM, it isn’t so straightforward, because of the need to establish
a trustworthy link between the user’s phone number and her key group. This
can be done by an online protocol if the phone is online as the overlay SIM is
first fitted, but otherwise might require copying quite a few digits.
4.2 Evolution 4: Delay-Tolerant Needham–Schroeder
In many applications of interest, both Alice and Bob will get network connec-
tivity from time to time as they travel to town or through areas with mobile
service. There is significant research in more general store-and-forward mecha-
nisms or delay-tolerant networks for extending service in LDCs. Even in the few
cases where one of the parties does not ever travel to town, connection can be
established via a data mule. For example, if Bob is old and housebound, while
his daughter Alice works in the big city and sends him money, a neighbour who
travels past Bob’s hut can take data to and from a point of network presence.
This should let us establish authenticated key exchange, although it appears to
be unexplored territory from the protocols community’s point of view.
An initial idea is to turn the bug in the Needham-Schroeder protocol [8] into
a feature. The fact that Bob has no guarantee of the freshness in Alice’s initial
exchange with Sam, and that she can therefore pass on a key packet to him a
month or even a year afterwards, can be used to create a delay-tolerant version of
the protocol. In order to preserve the original notation of [8], we reverse the roles
in this iteration whereby Alice (A) is the merchant travelling to the city (data
mule), and Bob (B) is the housebound villager who requires relayed messages
from Sam (S). We assume that Alice and Bob have just done the first transaction
in a new payment session, and want Sam’s help to set up a KAB that is present
only in their SIM cards and thus cannot be compromised if any other card is
reverse-engineered.
1. Alice catches the boat into town, and SIMA detects a connection. SIMA
automatically uploads transaction logs to Sam (to update shadow accounts
for reconciliation). She also sends a request to authenticate with any new
counterparty, in this case Bob 4:
A→ S : A,B,NA
4 The notation here follows the original Needham–Schroeder protocol [8].
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2. Sam sends KAB , via SMS or USSD, encrypted with the shared key KAS :
S → A : {NA, B,KAB , {KAB , A}KBS}KAS
3. When Alice returns to the village, SIMA can display, during transactions
discussed below, the authenticated shared key:
A→ B : {KAB , A}KBS .
4. The final two steps of the Needham–Schroeder protocol are performed offline
between the transacting parties, by showing authenticated nonces to obtain
agreement:
B → A : {NB}KAB
A→ B : {NB − 1}KAB
Note that an implementation would be likely to optimise this somewhat, for
usability reasons. The final two steps can be reduced to challenges and responses
of a few digits each using the methods in earlier sections, but the key packet
{KAB , A}KBS is harder. If KAB were a 128-bit key that alone would require
copying 40 decimal digits. Users of prepayment utility meters (including illiterate
users) regularly copy 20-digits strings that represent DES-encrypted commands,
so perhaps 40 digits can be done as a very occasional procedure. More likely,
an operator might take the view that 30 digits are enough; an 80-bit key would
not be the weakest link. Again, this requires real testing in the field. Where
users interact with merchants directly, the merchant can perhaps help (subject
to worries about the merchant ripping off vulnerable customers). But where a
helpful neighbour is acting as a data mule for an elderly and housebound Bob,
and carrying messages scribbled on bits of paper, 40 digits may well be too much.
More research is needed about how to integrate online payments, offline pay-
ments, data mules, and delay-tolerant networking in general. The value of this
research is not just to extend and enhance payment systems per se, but also all
sorts of other electronically enabled services, from pay-as-you-go solar panels to
agricultural subsidies and payments from aid donors.
To evaluate such systems we need to gain insight into what transactions
are taking place online versus offline; which transactions are critical (e.g. large
transactions or cash-outs); incentives for contacting back-end systems; incentives
for carrying data on behalf of other users; and realistic threat models. Should
we assume that everyone in a village would happily conspire to cheat a bank, or
that the headman or store owner in a village might be happy to be responsible
for the village’s good behaviour, or that villagers might vouch for each other?
5 Usability
Our goal was to achieve the most usable design that is acceptably secure. We
present here a cognitive walkthrough and error recovery analysis.
First, both customer and merchant have to enter each others’ phone numbers.
This happens anyway in phone payment systems, and there is a mistake every
few attempts. Even trained people who are alert make about one digit-entry
error per 200 digits [3], and so we expect at least one in ten attempts to sync
phone numbers to be problematic. In existing systems, error recovery can waste
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a call or a text. In our proposed system, an error is detected when Alice verifies
Bob’s challenge.
After Alice has entered Bob’s six-digit string and got an “OK”, she enters
her PIN to authorise the payment, just as at present. She then shows, or calls
out, the seven-digit payment code to Bob. If it’s accepted by his SIM card, his
phone will show “OK”. If she reads it wrong, or he types it wrong, then neither
has the money: her value counter has been decremented while his hasn’t been
increased yet. With good faith, they both have an incentive to retry until they
get it right; Alice wants the goods, after all, and Bob wants her money. Even
if Bob’s phone battery suddenly goes flat, they can write down the seven digits
and complete the transaction later.
If they are interrupted or never complete, then when Bob and Alice later
upload their transactions, Sam will have the data needed for dispute resolution.
If Bob is trying to cheat Alice by getting her to pay twice, he can report
an “OK” as a failure. Alice will detect the cheating on reconciliation. There is
however an issue here about whether Bob might abuse a position of power, or
Alice’s illiteracy. Similar attacks are possible on many other payment systems
(e.g. pension payments) and are mitigated by social rituals. We will experiment
with poster instructions that Bob should show Alice the results of typing in
the payment code; if this is overt so that everyone in the shop can see it, the
exploitation risk should be acceptable. Another possibility is a close-out code
from Bob, which we plan to field test.
6 Conclusion
Phone payments have been transformative in Africa, South Asia and elsewhere,
helping millions of the very poor to raise themselves from poverty, and helping
the less poor too. Extending them to areas without network service will continue
this process but will also give disproportionate benefit to the very poor as the
existing networks have been rolled out first to the less poor regions. The Gates
Foundation advertised for a technology to do this and we won a grant from them
to build a prototype.
The mission is to design an offline electronic purse system optimised for use in
less developed countries. Unlike existing systems such as Geldkarte and Proton,
our design aims to maximise usability in off-network transactions by minimising
the number of digits a user has to speak, hear and type, while providing robust
recovery mechanisms for the inevitable errors and making sure there isn’t any
scalable attack that is large enough to care about.
In this paper we have set out the evolution of our proposed core payment
protocol. There are a number of lessons already for protocol researchers.
First, when we start dealing with authentication protocols with short strings
of digits, our intuitions about security can fail us, and formal verification doesn’t
always help. Our first attempt at a protocol was vulnerable to a simple collision
attack, because we used the entropy that was visible rather than all the entropy
available. Worse, the defective protocol verified just fine using the BAN logic.
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That doesn’t imply that BAN is useless (as we did find another design flaw) but
just that it’s not enough in this context. We leave to future work whether other
verification tools can find such flaws.
Second, when dealing with very short authentication codes, transaction chain-
ing can be useful, and is a reasonable next step once we’ve learned to use all the
available entropy. It had already appeared a generation ago in EFTPOS systems
in Australia, where MAC residue was used for key updating, but then apparently
had been forgotten.
Third, when a system is offline part of the time, then the interaction between
the offline component and the online one bears careful study. If much of the world
will have to live with delay-tolerant networking, then it’s time to start thinking
about how to incorporate delay tolerance into the infrastructure, rather than its
being an occasional hack that developers will often get wrong. This may seem
counterintuitive to some providers, given that banks in the developed world spent
the first half of the 1990s ripping out offline capabilities from ATM systems, and
the second half reducing merchant floor limits for credit-card transactions. Yet
it’s noteworthy that when they introduced EMV in the 2000s, offline capabilities
reappeared, and they did so by placing carefully calibrated amounts of trust in
largely tamper-resistant smartcards and terminals.
A lot of services are going to have to coexist with network outages. That
means, we suggest, that the next challenge for the protocols community will
be to work out ways to build support for delay-tolerant networking into the
infrastructure. We hope the examples here will help start the discussion.
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